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Abstract: This paper analyzes the determinants of bank acquisitions both within and across 25 members of 
the European Union (EU-25) during the period 1997–2004. Our results suggest that poorly managed banks 
(those with a high cost-to-income ratio) and larger banks are more likely to be acquired by other banks in 
the same country. The probability of being a target in a cross-border deal is larger for banks that are 
quoted in the stock market. Finally, banks operating in more concentrated markets are less likely to be 
acquired by other banks in the same country but are more likely to be acquired by banks in other EU-25 
countries. 
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1. Introduction  
The development of a single financial market has been a long time objective for the European 
Union (EU). Its achievement received further impetus with the single market for financial 
services in the early 90´s and later by the introduction of the Euro. The goal of financial 
integration is better and more complete financial intermediation at lower cost. Better financial 
intermediation, in turn, results in higher economic growth, and productivity increases. However, 
quantifying the benefits of financial integration is difficult, as indirect benefits and the dynamic 
interaction with other economic processes are hard to identify and model (Faruqee, 2007). 
Cross-border banking in Europe remained rather limited until the launching of the Euro.  
In theory, it is possible for large cross-border banks to expand their activities via the opening of 
de novo operations. However, practice around the world has shown that de novo operations are 
usually a costly and slow way for a bank to enter a new market.
1 Thus, if a single financial 
market is to develop through cross-border banking, most likely it will require the acquisition of 
banks across Member boundaries within the EU.  
While the EU has seen significant overall consolidation in its financial sector according 
to the European Commission (2005), the Economics and Finance Ministers of the EU expressed 
dissatisfaction with the extent of cross-border consolidation in 2004.
2 In response to a request 
from the Ministers, the European Commission (2005) studied the extent of cross-border 
takeovers and found that it was proceeding more slowly in the financial sector due to regulatory 
                                                           
1 Dermine (2003) indicates that the number of foreign bank subsidiaries in Europe is high relative to the number of 
foreign branches. Both foreign subsidiaries and branches are more the result of takeovers than of greenfield 
investments. Also, Cabral et al. (2002) point out that the most effective way of gaining access to the retail banking 
sector is to merge with or acquire an existing local bank. 




and economic barriers to takeovers. According to market participants, an important regulatory 
barrier was political interference and misuse of supervisory powers. Perhaps partially due to 
these barriers, domestic deals have been, until recently, significantly larger than cross-border 
deals leading to "domestic champions" (European Commission, 2005). EU policy makers have 
responded by issuing Directive 2007 / 44/ CE of the European Parliament and the Council 
amending the procedural rules and evaluation criteria for prudential assessment of acquisitions 
and increase of shareholdings to reduce barriers to cross-border deals.      
  Another economic barrier according to the European Commission (2005) was the limited 
opportunities to pay for the deal by reducing costs.  One reason why costs were difficult to cut is 
that cross-border deals typically involved few duplicative operations. Cost cutting opportunities 
were also limited by governmental restrictions on laying off employees. In this regard, Carbó-
Valverde et al. (2007) conclude that reliance on scale alone to raise cost efficiency to achieve 
intra- and inter-country dominance may not be sufficient in the EU banking market.  
  The barriers to cross-border deals may not only reduce the frequency of cross-border 
takeovers but also change the types of banks that are acquired relative both to the type of banks 
acquired in domestic EU deals and relative to a market with fewer regulatory constraints such as 
the United States (US). For example, the cost inefficiency of potential takeover targets may be 
less important in cross-border deals in the EU than in domestic EU and US transactions. 
  The purpose of this paper is to identify the differences between the banks that were 
targets versus those that were not acquired in the first 25 members of the EU (the EU-25) over 
the period from 1997 through 2004. The results are compared with prior studies of takeovers in 




allowing some comparison of the relative importance of improving operations and other 
considerations in domestic versus cross-border takeovers.   
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the recent experience of 
domestic and cross border bank takeovers in the EU.  The economic rational of bank acquisitions 
both domestic and cross border as presented in the academic literature is analyzed in section 3.  
Section 4 describes the data as well as the univariate analysis while section 5 presents the results 
of the discrete choice models for our sample of European banks.  Finally, section six concludes. 
2. The recent experience of domestic and cross border bank acquisitions in the EU   
The number of credit institutions in the EU-25 fell from 9,747 in 2001 to 8,684 in 2005 (see 
ECB, 2006).  This decrease was to a large extent due to M&A within national boundaries. Allen 
et al. (2005) report 438 transactions that involved at least one credit institution of which 68% 
involved within border transactions over the period 2001-2004. This consolidation of the 
banking systems within countries in part reflects the efforts of at least some EU countries to 
create national champions that have the size to become major international players. The flip side 
of creating national champions firms is a significantly increased level of concentration in the 
local banking markets.  The (asset weighted average) five firm concentration ratio across the EU-
25 increased from 33% in 1997 to 45% in 2004.
3  This increase raises anti-trust concerns which 
eventually inhibit some within country combinations and encourage acquirers to look across 
borders. Domestic mergers may also create targets that have sufficiently large market share and 
perhaps also market power in their home market to be attractive to acquirers in other countries.
4 
                                                           
3 See European Central Bank (2006). These figures for the EU-25 are computed as the weighted average of the C5 
concentration ratios for each individual country, using total assets of each national banking system as weights.   
4 Acquirers may prefer a large market share in each country in which they operate to spread the fixed costs of 
conforming to the local cultural, legal and regulatory environment.  An acquirer seeking substantial market share in 




  The cross border bank consolidation that has occurred to date has not gotten to the point 
where it is likely to lead to real pan-European institutions in the short term. While the average 
acquiring banks are larger in cross-border deals than domestic deals according to the European 
Commission (2005), the average targets are the same size in domestic deals as in cross-border 
deals. The acquirer is more likely to take a minority ownership position in cross-border deals 
than in domestic deals.
5  Moreover, until very recently cross-border banking consolidation has 
mainly taken place within regional areas in the EU, primarily the Benelux and Nordic Countries.  
Acquisitions in the new member states likely occurred because many Central and Eastern 
European countries suffered banking crises in the early years of their independence and allowed 
their failed banks to be acquired by foreign banks.
6 Other special circumstances have fostered 
those acquisitions such as run-up to EU membership and the privatization process. Three new 
member states joined Luxembourg in having over 80% of their banking assets in banks from 
other EU countries, while three other new member countries have almost 60%. Consequently, 
the new member states have given added impetus to cross-border banking issues (Garcia, 2007). 
The literature on takeovers in the EU reflects the growing interest in financial 
consolidation in the EU. However, the literature on the EU remains small relative to the large 
number of studies of US bank takeovers. No study has yet examined the determinants of 
takeovers across the entire EU25, albeit a few studies discussed in the following section have 
examined the determinants of takeover targets in parts of the EU.   
  Some related studies analyze the stock market returns of the participants around the time 
of the takeover announcement. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) study a sample of acquisitions 
announced in European markets where at least one of the parties was a bank from 1988 through 
                                                           




1997. As is often found in event studies of takeover announcements, the targets have 
significantly positive abnormal returns and the acquirers have insignificant abnormal returns, 
findings which held for both domestic and cross-border takeovers. However, the weighted 
average returns of the combined firms are significantly positive for domestic deals and 
insignificant for cross-border deals. In contrast, Beitel et al. (2004) look at acquisitions in the EU 
15 where the acquiring organization was a bank over the period from 1985 to 2000. They find 
that the weighted average returns of the acquirer and target are not significantly influenced by 
whether the takeover is a cross-border acquisition in a multiple regression framework. 
Hagendorff et al. (2008), also focus on banks from the EU 15 plus Switzerland over a more 
recent time period, from 1996-2004.  They differ from the prior studies that focus on earlier time 
periods in that they find that acquirer returns are significantly positive for most of their event 
periods. Their results suggest that the more recent mergers may be qualitatively different from 
those in earlier periods suggesting that studies focusing on more recent mergers may provide 
more relevant to likely future takeovers. 
3. Determinants of bank acquisitions: A review of the literature 
Most of the literature on the characteristics of targets in bank takeovers focuses on U.S. banks, 
with a large fraction of the studies focusing on takeovers of publicly traded firms. The U.S. study 
most closely related to our paper is by Hannan and Pilloff (2007). They note that most U.S. 
studies either focus on narrow subsets of banks, such as publicly traded banks, or they have 
problems identifying changes in control.
7  Hannan and Pilloff (2007) avoid errors in identifying 
changes in control by using a U.S. commercial bank merger data set from SNL Financial which 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 See Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) for a test of the efficiency versus market power hypotheses as explanations 
of bank takeovers in Central and Eastern Europe. 
7 Studies with very large U.S. samples often rely on the merger of bank charters to identify takeovers.  Hannan and 




focuses exclusively on takeovers where there was a change in control. Hannan and Pilloff (2007) 
separate their sample into in-market and out-of-market acquisitions, a split that roughly 
corresponds to our split between domestic and cross-border deals. 
A few recent papers also examine the determinants of takeovers in Europe. Molyneux 
(2003) highlights the desire to avoid regulatory, information and other barriers as the main 
motive for overseas expansion. Moreover, analyzing a sample of M&As that took place in 
Europe between 1995 and 2000, he also finds that domestic deals are more motivated by cost 
efficiency considerations, whereas earnings diversification may be more important for cross-
border bank deals. Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) examine the determinants of Western 
European bank takeovers of targets in Central and Eastern Europe over the 1995 through 2002 
period as a part of a broader study of the implications of bank takeovers in that area. Pasiouras et 
al. (2007) analyze takeover targets and acquirers in the EU-15 over the 1997 to 2002 period with 
a focus on the role of differences in regulation.
8   
  This study is similar to Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) and Pasiouras et al. (2007) in 
that it looks at traded and non-traded banks over more than one European country. However, this 
differs from both of the European bank takeover studies in two important ways. First, this paper 
analyzes both domestic and cross-border takeovers using the same model. Lanine and Vander 
Vennet (2007) focus exclusively in cross-border takeovers whereas Pasiouras et al. (2007) do not 
distinguish domestic from cross-border takeovers.  Our analysis of both types of takeovers in the 
same model allows us to address the European Commission’s dissatisfaction with the extent of 
cross-border consolidation. Second, the sample of banks better matches the responsibilities of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
holding companies (BHCs).  Mergers may occur without a change in control if the banks are owned by the same 
BHC.  Conversely, a change in control may occur without the loss of a charter if the BHC keeps the target’s charter. 




EU as this study is drawn from the entire EU-25 set of countries, whereas both prior studies used 
subsets of the EU-25. 
This section surveys the literature on the determinants of bank takeovers, with special 
attention to the results in Hannan and Pilloff (2007), Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007), and 
Pasiouras et al. (2007). The section is organized around the various factors typically found to be 
the most likely determinants of bank acquisitions.  
3.1. Target operating performance 
 One of the main motives underlying acquisitions is to improve the efficiency of the target. These 
gains are more likely to be achievable if the target bank is underperforming. Therefore, 
indicators of performance should contain explanatory power on the likelihood of being acquired. 
In particular, banks with lower profitability or inefficiency might be more attractive for 
acquisition.  However, while it is true that underperforming banks provide greater opportunities 
for improvement, they are also more risky, especially if the source of the underperformance is a 
high level of bad loans.  In such a case, a local acquirer may be in a better position to identify the 
problems that need to be fixed than an out-of-market acquirer. Thus, indicators of performance 
should a priori be more relevant to explain in-market acquisitions. 
   Hannan and Pilloff (2007) find that less profitable banks in the US are more likely to be 
acquired, regardless of the type of acquirer (except that the coefficient for large out-of-state 
acquirers is insignificantly negative), and a measure of inefficiency is found to be positively 
related to the probability of acquisition for the overall sample.
9 The results from the two 
European studies differ. The coefficients on the expense ratios in equations predicting targets are 
                                                           
9 See Amel and Rhoades (1989), Moore (1997), Knapp et al. (2006) and Koetter et al. (2007) for additional 
references supporting the hypothesis that acquisitions serve to transfer assets from poorly managed to better 
managed firms. By contrast, Hannan and Rhoades (1987) and Hadlock et al. (1999) report evidence against the 




insignificant in Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007).  In contrast, the coefficient on the return on 
average equity is significantly negative and the one in the cost to income ratio significantly 
positive in Pasiouras et al. (2007).   
3.2. Capitalization 
The capitalization of the target is frequently hypothesized to be related to its probability of being 
acquired but not all of the hypotheses have the same empirical implications.. Several hypotheses 
predict a positive relationship between banks’ capitalization and the likelihood of being a target. 
First, if acquirers face regulatory pressure to increase capitalization they may seek highly 
capitalised targets. Second, if high capitalization indicates the inability of a bank to diversify 
assets, more capitalized banks would be more attractive for better diversified acquirers. Third, 
the managers of banks with high capital ratios may be operating further below their profit 
potential because of reduced pressure to obtain high earnings. On the other hand, some 
hypotheses predict a negative relationship. First, if capitalization is seen as an index of 
managerial efficiency, then better capitalized banks would be less attractive to potential buyers, 
since the potential gains from a better management are smaller. Second, if a bank’s capitalization 
is very low, an acquisition by a well capitalized acquirer might be fostered by the supervisor. 
Third, Hannan and Pilloff, (2007) suggest that buyers prefer high leveraged (poor capitalized) 
targets because it enables them to maximize the magnitude of post-merger performance gains 
relative to the cost of achieving those gains. For a given asset size, the purchase price premium 
of the acquisition is generally lower, the higher capitalized is the bank. 
Akhigbe et al. (2004) find a positive relationship between capital and the likelihood of 
being acquired in their sample of publicly traded banks in the U.S.  However, most studies, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
most consistent with an entrenchment hypothesis, where management teams with significant ownership positions 




including Hannan and Pilloff’s (2007) results for their entire sample, and Lanine and Vander 
Vennet (2007) analysis of Central and Eastern European countries none of which were members 
of the EU before 2004, find that banks with higher capital-asset ratios are less likely to be 
acquired. The coefficient on the capital to asset ratio is insignificant in Pasiouras et al. (2007) 
using a sample from the EU-15. 
3.3. Prospects for future growth 
Banks experiencing high growth may be more attractive targets, as the potential gains arising 
from improved management are likely to be larger in targets that operate in expanding markets.  
Consistent with this hypothesis, some U.S. studies from the 1980s, including Hannan and 
Rhoades (1987) and Cheng et al. (1989), find that the likelihood of acquisition is positively 
related to the growth rate of the assets of the target bank. However, Moore (1996) argues that 
slower growing targets may make more attractive to buyers looking to increase the target’s 
growth rate. Consistent with Moore (1996), Pasiouras et al. (2007) obtain a negative coefficient 
on the past growth rate. Hannan and Pilloff (2007) and Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) do not 
include a growth variable.  
3.4. Size 
Smaller banks may be more attractive to acquirers to the extent that these banks are more easily 
integrated into an acquirer’s operations. Smaller banks are also less likely to raise concerns by 
the competition authorities. On the other hand, if the acquiring organization is seeking 
economies of scale or market power through the acquisition then acquiring one large bank may 
provide those economies or market power sooner and possibly at lower cost than a series of 
small acquisitions. Hannan and Pilloff (2007) find that larger banks are more likely to be 




(2007) and Pasiouras et al. (2007) also have a significantly positive coefficient on total assets. 
However, when Hannan and Pilloff (2007) focus on acquisitions by smaller acquirers they find 
that larger banks are less likely to be acquired, consistent with the hypothesis that post-merger 
integration is more difficult for relatively large targets.  
3.5. Industry concentration 
The degree of banking concentration potentially affects the likelihood of acquisitions through its 
impact on bank competition. Increased concentration may increase the attractiveness of the target 
banks in that market. However, takeovers that would further increase concentration may be 
opposed by antitrust authorities.
10 The result may be that increased concentration in the target’s 
market increases the bank’s attractiveness to both domestic and cross-border acquirers.   
However, the probability of being acquired by a domestic bank may decline in more 
concentrated markets due to opposition by the antitrust authorities. Hannan and Pilloff (2007) 
fail to find any statistically significant evidence that competition issues are a determinant of 
takeover targets.
11 The coefficient on their measure of market concentration is consistently 
insignificant and the sign of the coefficient on their measure of size does not change between in-
market and out-of-market acquisitions. However, Pasiouras et al. (2007) report a significantly 
negative coefficient on the five firm concentration ratio in their sample of European takeovers, 
perhaps reflecting differences in concentration with Hannan and Pilloff’s U.S. sample. 
                                                           
10 Other studies such as Ashton and Khac (2008) empirically assess merger specific efficiency pass through into 
consumer prices as a standard for assessing the competitive effects of mergers. Specifically the relationship between 
efficiency gains achieved by merging firms and how these benefits are, or are not, passed on to their customers in 
the form of improved prices is examined. 
11 Hannan and Rhoades (1987) and Moore (1997) find that the effect of concentration on the acquisitions likelihood 
is significantly positive for out-of-market acquisitions but negative for in-market acquisitions, thus reflecting the 




3.6. Management incentives 
To the extent that managers of the target banks may lose their job positions or, at least, may 
suffer a reduction in their executive autonomy or in their job responsibilities, they may oppose 
takeover bids even if the deals are value maximizing for their shareholders. For example, 
Hadlock et al. (1999) find that banks with higher levels of management ownership are less likely 
to be acquired, especially in acquisitions where target managers depart from the banking 
organization following the acquisition. In this paper, we do not explore the role of management 
incentives due to the lack of appropriate data 
3.7. Other target characteristics 
Lack of appropriate and good quality data also precludes us from considering in our empirical 
study other bank level potential determinants of bank acquisitions that have been studied in the 
U.S. literature. First, Wheelock and Wilson (2000) consider different indicators of asset quality 
and find that some proxies for suspect loans are negatively related to the probability of 
acquisition.  We have not considered this type of ratio mainly because of the different regulatory 
criteria among countries and within countries over the study period. Second, Hannan and Pilloff 
(2007) study the role of the composition of the target’s clientele and they find that the higher is 
the local nature of deposits the higher is the likelihood of being acquired (see also Ahkhigbe et 
al., 2004). They argue that this result may reflect the possibility of cross-selling new products to 
newly acquired local depositors. Finally, both Wheelock and Wilson (2000) and Hannan and 
Pilloff (2007) considers bank’s age to capture the effect of length of time since opening in the 
probability of being acquired. They generally find a negative sign which they interpret as the age 




4. Empirical approach 
We first attempt to identify those observable characteristics that are related to a bank 
becoming a target by estimating a logit model. The empirical model is based on models that have 
been estimated using U.S. data with some modifications to reflect data availability and market 
differences in Europe. The model for estimating the probability of being acquired by another 
bank takes the form:  
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where  Pjt is the probability of bank j being acquired in period t and the β are vectors of 
coefficients. 
 As a second approach, we estimate a multinomial logit model that allows the effect of 
the explanatory variables to differ for acquisitions where both the target and the acquirer banks 
are located in the same country versus acquisitions where the target and acquired banks are 
located in different countries.  The multinomial logit models are similar except for the change in 




jt which are respectively the probability of being acquired 
in a domestic or cross-border transaction, and separate vectors of coefficients, β
D and β
CB , are 
estimated for domestic and cross-border takeovers. The independent financial and market 
specific variables are lagged one year. 
Our empirical model has three proxies for the target’s operating performance.  The first is 
Bankscope’s cost-to-income ratio, with higher values indicating greater cost inefficiency.  Thus, 
the expected sign on the coefficient for this ratio is positive if worse performing banks are more 
attractive targets. The other two proxies are the net interest margin which measures the interest 
spread between what the bank earns on its assets and pays on its liabilities (net interest income as 




returns to shareholders. The expected coefficients on these variables are negative if worse 
performing banks are more attractive targets but they may be positive if they are more resistant 
to being acquired. 
The capitalization of the target is measured as the ratio of equity to total assets.  As the 
studies of U.S. takeovers have found, the expected sign depends on which of several effects 
dominate. The relationship will be positive if: (1) acquirers face supervisory pressure to maintain 
or raise their post-acquisition capital ratios, (2) targets with higher capital ratios are less 
diversified or are operating less efficiently. The expected sign will be negative if: (1) higher 
target capital ratios are associated with more managerial ability, (2) banks that are near or below 
supervisory minimums are more likely to sell out, or (3) the acquirers will pay higher premiums 
as a proportion of equity for less well capitalized banks.   
Growth opportunities are proxied with the annual growth rate of the target’s assets and 
the annual growth rate of the target country’s gross domestic product (GDP).  The expected sign 
on both growth rates is positive if growing targets offer acquirer’s the potential of larger gains 
from improved management.  However, the sign may be negative if slower growing targets offer 
acquirer’s better opportunities to improve management. 
The proxy for a bank’s size is its total assets at year end.  The expected sign on this 
variable is positive if acquirers primarily value the fact that larger targets provide the acquirer 
with a larger position in the target’s marketplace all else equal.  However, the expected sign is 
negative to the extent that acquirer’s primary concern is the difficulty in combining the target’s 
operations with that of the acquirer.   
The proxies for local market concentration are the five firm concentration ratio and the 




is headquartered. All else equal, more concentrated markets may offer the acquirer higher profit 
opportunities. However, higher concentration levels may reduce the likelihood of an in-market 
takeover to the extent that the authorities seek to maintain competitive banking markets. 
 The  Other variables proxy for the target’s willingness to be acquired (including the type 
of business specialization
12: commercial banks, medium and long term banks and holding 
company banks) and for the unique conditions in the new members states of the EU.  The proxy 
for the target’s willingness is its stock listing, which takes a value of one if the bank is listed on 
the stock exchange and zero otherwise. The expected sign on this variable is positive as acquirers 
may have more ways of pressing reluctant target managers and boards to accept a takeover. That 
is potential acquirers of banks that are listed may threaten to acquire some of the target’s stock 
and to appeal to the target’s other shareholders for support of its takeover bid. The proxy for the 
new member states takes a value of one if the bank is headquartered in those countries that 
joined the EU after 2000 and before the last enlargement in 2007. The expected sign on this 
variable is positive. Acquisitions in the new member states often occurred because many Central 
and Eastern European countries suffered banking crises in the early years of their independence 
and allowed their failed banks to be acquired by foreign banks. Other special circumstances have 
fostered those acquisitions such as run-up to EU-25 membership and the privatization process.  
5. Data and descriptive analysis  
5.1. Sample selection 
The sample consists of banks from the EU-25 available on the Bankscope database from 1996 
(before the introduction of the Euro) through 2004 (the last year prior the adoption of the 
                                                           
12 As an alternative to control for bank specialization, we estimated the model with the ratio of other operating 
income over average assets to capture the relative importance of fee-based activities. It could be argued that if banks 




international financial reporting standards –IFRS- by the EU banks).
13 Our database includes 
5,493 observations corresponding to 1,342 EU-25 largely private banks incorporated as joint 
stock companies of which, 75 are independent institutions and the rest are subsidiaries of 
financial or non financial institutions as of last reporting year. All the sample banks have 
controlling European shareholding in order to exclude M&As motivated by strategic decisions of 
non EU controlling shareholders. 
14   
The data on acquisitions were obtained from the M&As Deals Module of Thomson One 
Banker over the period starting in 1997 and ending just before the switch from national 
accounting standards to the IFRS in 2004. We have included only those transactions that 
involved a change in control where both the target and the acquirer were banking institutions. 
We have considered that a change in control takes place when a bank or bank holding company 
that owns less than 20% of the target’s equity increases its shareholding to at least 20%. This 
also represents a typical pattern of staggered shareholding acquisitions of banks in the EU 
(European Commission, 2005) and the minimum threshold for authorization by the prudential 
supervisors of the host country as established in the EU Directive.
15 The sample of acquisitions 
in the EU-25 contains 157 deals, of which 39 were cross-border.    
Table 1 provides information on the geographic distribution of the overall sample and the 
takeover distribution (by host country of the target) and the number of takeovers by year.   
Takeovers are split into domestic takeovers where the acquirer is from the same country and 
cross-border takeovers.  Domestic takeovers are approximately three times as common.     
                                                                                                                                                                                           
motivation for merger activity.  However, this variable is consistently insignificant when included in the model 
presented below and the other results are essentially unchanged. 
13 The characteristics of the sample banks are as follows for the EU25: Commercial banks; mortgage and real estate 
banks, medium and long term credit banks, bank holding companies, which all of them report on local GAAP.  
14 21 are public or government controlled banks of which 9 are part of the Nordea Group.  Only one of these banks 




5.2. Descriptive analysis of the sample of EU-25 banks 
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis are broken down three ways and are provided in 
Tables 2, 3, and 4. Table 2 compares the performance of target and non-target banks for the 
entire sample. Table 3 compares the same performance measures for targets relative to the 
median values in the bank’s market in which operates. Table 3 also compares the performance of 
listed and non-listed targets. Finally, Table 4 provides a univariate analysis of the differences 
between targets in domestic takeovers and the targets in cross-border takeovers. For the 
observations included in the target sample the variables are evaluated at the year immediately 
before the target bank is acquired. The variables are defined in the Appendix.  
5.2.1. Target vs. non- target banks 
The results in Table 2 show that acquired bank in our sample are less profitable and have a 
higher ratio of cost to income at both the mean and median values.
16  The median target bank had 
higher net interest revenue and other operating income as percentages of average assets but the 
differences are not significant at the mean values.  The overall profitability results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that acquirers seek out poorly performing targets.   
The scale of the target banks is generally similar to that of banks that were not acquired, 
regardless of whether scale is measured by total assets, deposits and short-term funds, net income 
or employees. Finally, target banks are also not significantly different in their leverage ratio.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15 In almost all cases, once an acquirer has more than 20% it ultimately buys at least 50% of the target during the 
study period. Also, IFRS requires that a 20% share ownership be accounted for as a permanent investment. 
16 The difference of means tests are generated from regressions that pool the data from the two groups of banks 
being compared. These regressions are specified as: Xit=a+b*Dit+eit, where Xit is the variable being tested, Dit is a 
dummy equal to 1 for banks in the second of the two pooled samples, and eit is a random disturbance term with zero 
mean. The statistical difference of b from zero provides the test of statistical significance for the difference of 
means. In turn, the difference of median tests are nonparametric two-sample tests for the null hypothesis that the two 




5.2.2. Target banks vs. national markets 
Table 3 shows means and medians of the financial ratios of the target banks relative to the 
median value of home market. The expense, revenue and profitability results in Table 3 for the 
sample as a whole are broadly consistent with those in Table 2.  Targets have significantly higher 
cost to income ratios and other operating income to asset ratios (but not significantly different 
net interest revenue to average asset ratios).  The net result is that targets have significantly lower 
profitability by all three measures (pre-tax operating income to assets, return on average assets 
and return on average equity).  However, when the results are broken down by whether the target 
is listed on a stock exchange, the statistical significance appears to be entirely driven by banks 
that are not listed.
17  This finding is consistent with Campa and Hernando (2006) finding that 
although targets display on average a worse financial performance than their buyers, they do no 
significantly underperform with respect to the average bank of their national market. 
Although the average target bank is similar in scale to the average bank in the EU in 
Table 2, Table 3 shows that target banks are typically larger along all four dimensions (total 
assets, deposits and short term funding, net income and total employees) than other banks in their 
country.  The greater scale holds for all four of the scale variables, in terms of mean.  The sole 
exception is that the mean scale in terms of net income of listed banks is not different from the 
mean scale of other banks in the target’s home country.   
Finally, results in terms of capitalization are not conclusive perhaps due to the small 
number of observations (see Table 3): the mean of the difference of the total capital ratio with 
respect to the country median is significantly positive while the median of this difference is 
significantly negative. This suggests that target banks tend to be less capitalized than their 
                                                           




country median but there are a few non-listed target banks with very high capital ratios that seem 
to determine the positive sign of the mean. 
5.2.3. Domestic vs.  cross-border deals 
Table 4 shows the comparison between means and medians for both types of target banks and the 
statistical significance of the differences in their ratios. Differences between domestic and cross-
border targets are in almost all cases not statistically significant. The only exceptions are the 
medians of the other operating income and pre-tax operating income over average asset ratios 
which are significantly higher in the case of cross-border targets. These results suggest that, a 
priori, both types of target banks tend to share similar financial characteristics. 
6. Multivariate analysis: The probability of being acquired  
6.1.1. Determinants of the likelihood of a bank being acquired 
The results of estimating the probability of being acquired in any takeover in the EU-25 
presented in Table 5 are broadly consistent with the results found in Hannan and Pilloff (2007), 
and Pasiouras et al. (2007) with some exceptions.
18 Consistent with their results, the coefficient 
on the cost to income ratio is positive and statistically significant. These results suggest that 
acquirers prefer to acquire banks with expense cutting opportunities. The coefficients on net 
interest revenue and return on average equity are insignificant.  
The coefficient on the equity to asset ratio is close to zero and is statistically insignificant 




negative coefficient on this variable. Probably the biggest inconsistency with the results typically 
obtained from U.S. data relate to growth. Hannan and Pilloff (2007) do not include a growth 
variable, but other studies that have done so tend to obtain a significantly positive coefficient. 
The annual total asset growth rate of the target’s assets is insignificant in Table 5, but the GDP 
annual growth rate of the local economy is significantly negative. This result suggests that once 
we have controlled for bank-specific financial indicators, acquisitions are more likely in cyclical 
downturns. However, these results are broadly consistent with Pasiouras, et al.’s (2007) finding 
of a significantly negative coefficient on banks asset growth. 
The results for size are consistent with Hannan and Pilloff (2007), Lanine and Vander 
Vennet (2007), and Pasiouras et al. (2007): Larger banks are more likely to be targets. We also 
use two proxies for market concentration, the five largest banks concentration ratio and the HHI.  
Differently from Pasiouras et al. (2007) but consistently with Hannan and Pilloff (2007), the 
market concentration variables are not statistically significant. 
The coefficients on both whether the bank was listed and whether it was headquartered in 
a New Member State are significant.  Banks that are listed in stock exchanges are more likely to 
be acquired, even after having controlled for size. Significantly positive coefficients are obtained 
for the dummy for New Member States reflecting the fact that bank acquisitions have been 
relatively frequent in these countries during the study period. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
18 Risk considerations have been found to play an important role in bank mergers in  Benston et al. (1995) and Buch 
and DeLong (2008). We cannot replicate Buch and DeLong (2008) stock market based measures of risk as our 
sample is dominated by non-listed firms, so we follow Benston et al. (1995) in using accounting measures to proxy 
for the variability of accounting earnings, specifically the standard deviation of ROA or standard deviation of ROE 
measured over the prior four years. In order to estimate these risk measures using data from prior periods, this part 
of our analysis focuses on the years 2000 to 2004. We fail to find statistically significant differences between targets 
and non-acquired firms and between domestic and cross-border takeovers in any of our analysis.  
 As robustness checks, we also estimated the model with a variable that takes a value of 1 if the bank is 
independent, that is not owned by another firm (we use the Bankscope criteria for independence). This variable is 




6.1.2. Determinants of the likelihood of a bank being acquired by a domestic or foreign EU bank 
Table 6 displays the results of the estimation of a multinomial logit model that allows for 
different effects of the explanatory variables on the likelihood of being acquired by banks in the 
same country and on the likelihood of being acquired by banks in a different country within the 
EU25. Overall, the pattern of the results for the explanatory variables related to the conditional 
probability of domestic acquisitions is similar to those reported in the previous paragraphs. 
However, there is one important difference: the concentration variables are both negative and 
statistically significant indicating that acquisitions by banks operating in the same country are 
less likely in more concentrated markets.  
  Interestingly, the coefficients of the concentration variables are positive and statistically 
significant in explaining cross border acquisitions within the EU. Cross-border deals are less 
likely to increase concentration and, thus, raise competition concerns because a cross-border 
acquirer is likely to have little or no market share in the target’s domestic market. Additionally, 
foreign banks may be attracted by the possibility of higher rents which might be obtained in 
more concentrated markets.   
Figure 1 shows the marginal effects of an increase in bank cost efficiency and in market 
concentration on the probability of a bank being a target in a domestic and a cross border deal.  
While the probability of a bank being acquired in any given year is small, the coefficient 
estimates suggest that impact of some variables on the percentage change in the probability of 
being acquired can be substantial.  For example, an increase in the five firm concentration ratio 
from 48% to 58% reduces (increases) the probability of a bank being target in a domestic (cross-
border) deal from 1.6% to 1.3% (from 0.4% to 0.5%).  These changes represent an approximate 




a cross-border deal.  An increase in the cost to income from 64% to 74% has a smaller impact, 
increasing the probability of a bank being a target of a domestic deal from 1.8% to 1.9%.   
  Most of the variables explaining the probability of a cross-border takeover are statistically 
insignificant, including the cost to income ratio.
19 In addition to the significant positive 
coefficients on the concentration measures, the other significant coefficient is on stock exchange 
listing,  This coefficient is positive suggesting that listed banks are more likely to be acquired, 
which may be explained by the greater information available on banks that are publicly traded. 
  The differences of the coefficients of the domestic and cross border regressions are only 
statistically significant in the case of the proxies for market concentration and the dummy for 
New Member States.
20 The small number of cross-border transactions seems to explain the lack 
of significance of most coefficients in cross-border regression as well as most of the differences 
between coefficients in both regressions. 
Table 7 displays the estimation of multinomial logit models where the bank-specific 
financial ratios have been replaced for the corresponding ratios defined with respect to the 
median ratio of the banks operating in the same country. The main differences with Table 6 are 
that the coefficient on the cost to income ratio becomes significantly positive and the coefficient 
on stock market listing becomes statistically insignificant in the case of the cross-border deals.  
Banks which are being acquired cross-border are less efficient than other banks in their country 
but are no more likely to be listed on a stock exchange.
21 
                                                           
19 Nevertheless, the cost to income ratio is close to being significant. The p-values of its coefficient in columns 1 and 
2 of Table 6 are 0.12 and 0.13, respectively. 
20  The differences of the coefficients of the proxies for market concentration are significant at the 1% level.  The 
difference of the coefficients of the New Member State is significant at the 10% level. 
21 Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that the cost to income ratio was close to being significant in Table 6 (p-
values of 0.12 and 0.13) and that the stock listing dummy is close to being significant in the specifications reported 





There is considerable interest in bank consolidation within Europe, especially across member 
boundaries, but relatively little work has been done in this area.  This paper adds to the growing 
literature on the determinants of which banks are acquired in two important ways.  First, we 
analyze both within country and cross-border targets in the same model, allowing us to identify 
differences in the types of firms acquired in the two types of mergers.  Second, we look at the 
entire EU-25 rather than a subset of EU countries. Our sample consists of 1342 private banks 
incorporated as joint stock companies under majority European shareholding. This sample 
contains both listed and non-listed banking firms, while most of the M&A research focuses on 
listed banks. The sample includes 157 deals in which both the acquirer and the target where 
banks, of which 39 were cross-border. Our definition of change in control is consistent not only 
with the minimum threshold for authorization by the prudential supervisors of the host country 
established in the EU Directive but also with the typical pattern of staggered shareholding 
acquisitions of banks in the EU.  The deals were announced between 1997 and 2004.  
The findings of this paper are broadly in line with those of the academic literature on the 
subject including Hannan and Pilloff (2007), Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007), and Pasiouras et 
al. (2007).  More precisely, the major conclusions of this paper are as follows: 
o  Although theory suggests that performance may be less important in determining European 
targets than U.S. targets, our results suggest poorly managed EU-25 banks (high cost to 
income) are more likely to be acquired by other banks in the same country. This result 
supports the hypothesis that efficiency gains are more likely to be achievable if the target 




o  Larger banks are more likely to be acquired by other banks in the same country. This finding 
seems to reflect that the acquisition of large banks is more beneficial in terms of achieving 
product diversification and penetration in new market segments. This may also suggest that 
the supervisory authorities like to create national champions in the banking industry. 
o  Domestic acquisitions have been more likely in the New Member States reflecting the 
intense privatization process in these countries.  
o  Domestic and cross-border takeovers appear to differ in the area of market concentration.  
Domestic takeovers are less likely in more concentrated markets but cross-border takeovers 
are more likely.  This seems to indicate that outside banks within the EU are attracted by high 
rents, which might be obtained in more concentrated markets, without these deals having an 
impact on market concentration and been challenged by the national authorities. 
o  Our results on the impact of efficiency on the probability of being acquired by a foreign bank 
are mixed. Our regression results using the levels of efficiency suggest that inefficient and 
less profitable banks are not more likely to be targets in cross border deals. However, 
efficiency is statistically significant when measured relative to the median of the market. 
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Annex: 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 
This ratio is the total capital adequacy ratio under the Basle rules. It measures Tier 1 + Tier 2 
capital which includes subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves and the valuation 
reserves as a percentage of risk weighted assets and off balance sheet risks.  
 
Equity / Total Assets  
Is the ratio of total equity to assets, sometimes called the leverage ratio. 
 
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) 
Net income divided by average assets.  Average assets are the arithmetic mean of the value at the 
end of year t and t-1. In order not to lose information, when figures are available for one year 
only, ratios implying average figures are nevertheless calculated using the values of the only 
available year.  
 
Return on Average Equity (ROAE)  
Net income divided by average owners equity where average equity is the arithmetic mean of the 
value at the end of year t and t-1. In order not to lose information, when figures are available for 
one year only, ratios implying average figures are nevertheless calculated using the values of the 
only available year.  
 
Cost to Income Ratio  
Overhead expense as a percentage of the sum of net interest revenue and other operating income. 
 
Net Interest Margin  




Net Interest Income / Average Assets  
This ratio indicated the same but expressed as a percentage of the total balance sheet. 
 
Other Operating Income / Average Assets  
Other, or non-interest, operating income divided by average assets, where average assets are 
defined similar to average assets for ROAA. 
 
Pre-Tax Operating Income / Average Assets  
Pre-tax operating income divided by average assets, where average assets are defined similar to 














































PROBABILITY OF A BANK ACQUISTION. INFLUENCE OF THE COST TO INCOME 
RATIO AND OF THE C5 CONCENTRATION RATIO (a)
a. Probabilities computed for model [1] in table 6. A representative bank has been considered to be a commercial non-









































 Table 1.   Number of banks in the sample by country and year 
 
      Total  number 
   Number acquired in a  of banks 
    domestic deal  cross-border deal  in the sample 
Home country of bank         
        
Austria   0  2  49 
Belgium   4  2  58 
Cyprus   0  0  6 
Czech Republic    1  1  15 
Denmark   2 4  64 
Estonia   1  0  2 
Finland   0  2  14 
France   14  5  183 
Germany   17  4  207 
Greece   8  1  20 
Hungary   4  1  21 
Ireland   0  2  36 
Italy   39  1  183 
Latvia   0  1  1 
Lithuania   0 0  1 
Luxembourg   2  2  91 
Netherlands   0  3  49 
Poland   5  1  38 
Portugal   2  2  26 
Slovakia   0  0  5 
Slovenia   1  0  14 
Spain   10  4  55 
Sweden   1  0  39 
United Kingdom     7    1  165 
Total   118  39  1342 
        
Breakdown by year of announcement     
        
1997   15  5   
1998   25  5   
1999   20  8   
2000   18  6   
2001   13  5   
2002   8  2   
2003   10  3   
2004     9    5   
Total   118  39   
        





Table 2. Summary statistics of banks that were acquired versus those of banks that were not acquired   
                      
 
Sample of banks that 
were acquired
a 
Sample of banks that 
were not acquired 
Test on 
Means




  Mean Median Mean Median  (p-value)     (p-value)     
              
Ex-ante characteristics              
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) %   0.18 0.38 0.68  0.50 0.09 * 0.07* 
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) %   3.61 5.95 9.09  8.44 0.02 ** 0.01***
Cost to Income Ratio %   79.42 74.25 67.41  64.87 0.00 *** 0.00***
Net Interest Revenue / Average Assets %   2.50 2.42 2.44  1.94 0.76 0.00***
Other Operating Income / Average Assets %   1.96 1.46 2.03  1.02 0.89 0.00***
Pre-Tax Operating Income / Average Assets %  0.17 0.63 0.76  0.70 0.14 0.56 
Total Assets (thousand USD)   21200.00 1644.80 21100.00 1163.74 0.99 0.16 
Deposits & Short term funding (thousand 
USD)  17900.00 1460.58 15800.00 890.59 0.74 0.07* 
Number of Employees   4473.28 568.00 4195.14 192.00 0.88 0.01***
Net Income (thousand USD)   117.10 9.94 139.21  6.23 0.73 0.24 
Equity / Total Assets %   9.59 7.26 10.43  6.31 0.50 0.16 
Total Capital Ratio %   14.80 11.15 16.58  12.30 0.45 0.03** 
                         
               
***/**/* denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level.               
a Statistics for the sample of banks that were acquired correspond to the year before the acquisition. 
b The difference of means tests are generated from regressions that pool the data from the two groups of banks being compared. 
These regressions are specified as: Xit=a+b*Dit+eit, where Xit is the variable being tested, Dit is a dummy equal to 1 for banks that 
were acquired. 
c  The difference of median tests are non-parametric two-sample tests for the null hypothesis that the two samples of banks being 





Table 3:  Banks that were acquired: financial ratios with respect to the median value of the market 
                                      
                    
 
All target banks  Listed target banks  Non-listed target banks 
  Mean     Median     Mean     Median     Mean     Median    
                    
Ex-ante characteristics
a,b                    
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) %   -0.34 * -0.09*** -0.669 -0.04 -0.22 * -0.14*** 
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) %   -4.44*** -1.29 * -2.072 0.60 -5.33*** -3.04 ** 
Cost to Income Ratio %   10.55*** 6.90 ** 2.776 -0.25 13.30*** 7.94*** 
Net Interest Revenue / Average Assets %   -0.01 0.00 0.022 0.15 -0.03 0.00  
Other Operating Income / Average Assets %   0.65*** 0.06 0.269 0.05 0.79*** 0.08  
Pre-Tax Operating Income / Average Assets % -0.60 * -0.16 * -0.419 0.06 -0.71 ** -0.41*** 
Total Assets (USD millions)   19500.00*** 151.49 31500.00 ** 1839.27*** 15100.00*** -39.73  
Deposits & Short term funding (USD millions)  16600.00*** 759.28 ** 24700.00 ** 1519.31*** 12100.00 ** 89.44  
Net Income (USD millions)   108.27 ** 0.79 123.98 12.68*** 99.60 * -0.38  
Number of Employees   3967.25*** 138.50 * 6440.120 ** 427.5*** 2730.82 * 22.50  
Equity / Total Assets %   2.68*** -0.01 0.262 -0.57 * 3.57*** 0.34  
Total Capital Ratio %   2.91 ** -0.52 ** 0.398 -0.60 4.53 ** -0.45  
                    
***/**/* denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level.                       
a Characteristics are measured in differences with respect to the median value of each of the EU25 banking markets, that includes all banks in the 
country reporting to Bankscope  in our sample. 






Table 4:  Summary statistics of banks that were acquired: domestic versus cross-border deals   
                   
 
Sample of banks 
acquired in domestic 
deals
a 
Sample of banks 





b   
Test on 
Medians
c   
  Mean Median Mean Median  (p-value)   (p-value)   
            
Ex-ante characteristics            
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) %   0.09 0.31 0.47 0.59 0.39 0.23 
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) %   2.78 5.79 6.10 8.40 0.31 0.37 
Cost to Income Ratio %   80.14 74.44 77.31 71.44 0.63 0.69 
Net Interest Revenue / Average Assets %   2.61 2.50 2.18 1.91 0.12 0.23 
Other Operating Income / Average Assets %   1.80 1.28 2.46 1.89 0.17 0.10* 
Pre-Tax Operating Income / Average Assets %   0.03 0.46 0.49 0.87 0.51 0.04** 
Total Assets (USD millions)   22600.00 1701.31 16800.00 1462.06 0.61 0.45 
Deposits & Short term funding (USD millions)   19200.00 2349.82 14900.00 1178.68 0.69 0.25 
Net Income (USD millions)   156.06 8.62 21.19 11.45 0.12 0.82 
Number of Employees   4841.56 600.50 3640.65 423.00 0.67 0.67 
Equity / Total Assets %   9.51 7.08 9.82 7.59 0.88 0.96 
Total Capital Ratio %   14.78 10.90 14.87 11.90 0.98 0.24 
              
***/**/* denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level.               
a Statistics correspond to the year before the acquisition.   
b The difference of means tests are generated from regressions that pool the data from the two groups of banks being compared. These regressions are 
specified as: Xit=a+b*Dit+eit, where Xit is the variable being tested, Dit is a dummy equal to 1 for banks acquired in a cross-border deal. 
c The difference of median tests are non-parametric two-sample tests for the null hypothesis that the two samples of banks being compared were drawn from 




Table 5 Logit results for the determinants of the likelihood of a bank being acquired 
    
Variable [1]  [2] 
    
Cost to Income Ratio %   0.006***  0.005*** 
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) %   -0.005  -0.005 
Net Interest Margin 0  -0.002 
Equity / Total Assets %   0.007  0.007 
Total Assets   0.163***  0.162*** 
Asset growth  -0.046  -0.044 
Stock exchange listed  0.447*  0.433* 
Five firm concentration ratio  -0.006   
HHI   0 
Country specific GDP growth  -12.772**  -13.357** 
New Member States  1.314***  1.353*** 
Commercial bank binary  0.927**  0.902** 
Medium and Long-term Credit binary  0.94  0.907 
Holding Company binary  0.884  0.86 
1999 0.028  0.02 
2000 0.05  0.043 
2001 -0.56  -0.589* 
2002 -1.750***  -1.782*** 
2003 -0.842**  -0.874** 
2004 -0.840**  -0.865** 
Intercept -6.734***  -6.815*** 
    
Number of observations  5493  5493 
Pseudo_R2 0.055  0.055 
Log Likelihood  -479.679  -479.939 
chi2 55.933  55.412 
AIC 999.357  999.878 




Table 6 Multinomial logit results for the likelihood of being acquired by a domestic or a foreign bank:  Reported 
values for bank specific variables 
    
Variable [1]  [2] 
    
Domestic deal    
Cost to Income Ratio %   0.006***  0.006*** 
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) %   -0.006  -0.006 
Net Interest Margin  0.04  0.035 
Equity / Total Assets %   0.005  0.005 
Total Assets   0.201***  0.198*** 
Asset growth  -0.086  -0.075 
Stock exchange listed  0.346  0.315 
Five firm concentration ratio  -0.020***   
HHI   -0.001** 
Country specific GDP growth  -14.125**  -16.695** 
New Member States  1.884***  2.084*** 
Commercial bank binary  1.045**  0.983** 
Medium and Long-term Credit binary  1.043  0.981 
Holding Company binary  1.034  1.004 
1999 -0.211  -0.231 
2000 -0.063  -0.075 
2001 -0.798*  -0.905** 
2002 -1.788***  -1.913*** 
2003 -0.939**  -1.061** 
2004 -1.108**  -1.207*** 
Intercept -7.137***  -7.327*** 
    
Cross-border deal    
Cost to Income Ratio %   0.005  0.005 
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) %   -0.003  -0.003 
Net Interest Margin -0.204  -0.187 
Equity / Total Assets %   0.01  0.009 
Total Assets   0.043  0.048 
Asset growth  0.034  0.029 
Stock exchange listed  0.774*  0.792* 
Five firm concentration ratio  0.022**   
HHI   0.001** 
Country specific GDP growth  -7.644  -6.307 
New Member States  -0.287  -0.585 
Commercial bank binary  0.674  0.731 
Medium and Long-term Credit binary  0.527  0.598 
Holding Company binary  0.408  0.458 
1999 0.812  0.842 
2000 0.528  0.576 
2001 0.286  0.363 
2002 -1.458  -1.387 
2003 -0.346  -0.285 
2004 -0.005  0.026 
Intercept -7.577***  -7.290*** 
    
Statistics    
Number of observations  5493  5493 
Pseudo_R2 0.068  0.066 
Log Likelihood  -528.932  -530.321 
chi2 77.316  74.537 
AIC 1137.864  1140.643 




Table 7 Multinomial logit results of the likelihood of being acquired by a domestic or a foreign bank:  Bank 
specific variables relative to mean of national market (*) 
    
Variable [1]  [2] 
Domestic deal    
Relative Cost to Income Ratio %   0.005*  0.005* 
Relative ROAE %   -0.006  -0.006 
Relative Net Interest Margin  -0.027  -0.027 
Relative Equity / Total Assets %   0.003  0.003 
Total Assets   0.168***  0.167*** 
Asset growth  -0.081  -0.071 
Stock exchange listed  0.412  0.373 
Five firm concentration ratio  -0.021***   
HHI   -0.001** 
Country specific GDP growth  -14.852**  -17.569*** 
New Member States  1.939***  2.162*** 
Commercial bank binary  1.122**  1.060** 
Medium and Long-term Credit binary  1.075  1.019 
Holding Company binary  1.147*  1.117* 
1999 -0.211  -0.233 
2000 -0.045  -0.058 
2001 -0.825**  -0.937** 
2002 -1.769***  -1.905*** 
2003 -0.935**  -1.065** 
2004 -1.090**  -1.197*** 
Intercept -6.205***  -6.446*** 
    
Cross-border deal    
Relative Cost to Income Ratio %   0.006*  0.006* 
Relative ROAE %   -0.001  -0.001 
Relative Net Interest Margin  -0.169  -0.175 
Relative Equity / Total Assets %   0.013  0.012 
Total Assets   0.078  0.076 
Asset growth  0.025  0.022 
Stock exchange listed  0.606  0.643 
Five firm concentration ratio  0.020**   
HHI   0.001** 
Country specific GDP growth  -5.821  -4.599 
New Member States  -0.457  -0.732 
Commercial bank binary  0.659  0.712 
Medium and Long-term Credit binary  0.659  0.702 
Holding Company binary  0.44  0.48 
1999 0.818  0.845 
2000 0.546  0.595 
2001 0.317  0.391 
2002 -1.415  -1.342 
2003 -0.229  -0.17 
2004 0.081  0.111 
Intercept -8.133***  -7.751*** 
    
Statistics    
Number of observations  5493  5493 
Pseudo_R2 0.065  0.063 
Log Likelihood  -530.739  -531.851 
chi2 73.703  71.478 
AIC 1141.477  1143.702 
(*) The variables Relative Cost to Income Ratio %, Relative ROAE %, Relative Net Interest Margin, and Relative 
Equity / Total Assets % are defined as the individual bank ratio minus the median ratio of banks operating in that 
country. 
***/**/* denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. 
 